Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons

Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Manimay Sengupta

Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, vol. 2, issue 1, 39-54

Date: 1982
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