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An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit

Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantinos, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, vol. 54, issue 2, 152-175

Date: 2007
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