Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences

Levent Kutlu

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 55, issue 2, 255-257

Abstract: We show that there exist two Nash implementable social choice correspondences defined on an environment with strict preferences for which the intersection is not Nash implementable.

Date: 2008
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