A repeated coalitional bargaining model
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 55, issue 3, 292-298
This paper presents a repeated coalitional bargaining model in which after a coalitional bargaining terminates with an agreement, another coalitional bargaining begins. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient SSPE, i.e., an SSPE in which the grand coalition is formed without delay. This condition implies that as (i) payoffs from future coalitional bargaining are more valuable and (ii) players are less patient, an efficient SSPE more easily exists.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:55:y:2008:i:3:p:292-298
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