Coalition formation in games without side payments
Francesca Centrone and
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 56, issue 3, 314-320
We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability à la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295-1313] into the classical Shapley [lambda]-transfer value. Our analysis starts by first defining a new solution concept, the [lambda]-transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.
Keywords: Cooperative; games; Coalition; structures; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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