Economics at your fingertips  

Coalition formation in games without side payments

Francesca Centrone and C. Meo

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 56, issue 3, 314-320

Abstract: We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability à la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295-1313] into the classical Shapley [lambda]-transfer value. Our analysis starts by first defining a new solution concept, the [lambda]-transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.

Keywords: Cooperative; games; Coalition; structures; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2017-10-11
Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:3:p:314-320