Cooperative production and efficiency

Carmen Bevia (carmen.bevia@ua.es) and Luis Corchon

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, vol. 57, issue 2, 143-154

Abstract: We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

Keywords: Cooperative; production; Efficiency; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperative Production and Efficiency (2007)
Working Paper: Cooperative Production and Efficiency (2007)
Working Paper: Cooperative production and efficiency (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:57:y:2009:i:2:p:143-154

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