Informational requirements of social choice rules

Shin Sato

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, vol. 57, issue 2, 188-198

Abstract: The required amount of information to make a social choice is the cost of information processing, and it is a practically important feature of social choice rules. We introduce informational aspects into the analysis of social choice rules and prove that (i) if an anonymous, neutral, and monotonic social choice rule operates on minimal informational requirements, then it is a supercorrespondence of either the plurality rule or the antiplurality rule, and (ii) if the social choice rule is furthermore Pareto efficient, then it is a supercorrespondence of the plurality rule.

Keywords: Antiplurality; rule; Minimal; informational; requirement; Plurality; rule; Social; choice; rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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