Pure strategy equilibria in large demographic summary games

Van Kolpin

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, vol. 58, issue 1, 132-141

Abstract: Many economic environments involve interaction between small numbers of large players as well as large numbers of small players whose individual actions are macroscopically negligible even while summary behavior within various demographic groups may impact the entire economy. We examine Nash equilibria of such mixed size, multi-demographic summary games. In particular, we establish existence theorems for equilibria in which small players universally pursue pure strategies, even when large player behavior must be simultaneously considered.

Keywords: Nonatomic; games; Summary; statistics; Pure; strategy; Nash; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(09)00042-0
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:1:p:132-141

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().