Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly "Lumpy" public goods

Ryo Kawasaki and Shigeo Muto

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, vol. 58, issue 1, 98-109

Abstract: We examine farsighted stable sets in a public good provision game where the public good is perfectly "lumpy" as defined by Taylor [Taylor, M., 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge]. In this case, Taylor argues that the game is not a prisoners' dilemma game. While Suzuki and Muto [Suzuki, A., Muto, S., 2005. Farsighted stability in an n-Person Prisoner's dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 33, 431-445] have shown that almost all outcomes included in a farsighted stable set of a prisoners' dilemma game are Pareto efficient, we show in our game that almost all strictly individually rational outcomes are included in a farsighted stable set, including those that are not Pareto efficient.

Keywords: Farsighted; stable; sets; Public; goods; "Lumpy"; goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:1:p:98-109

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