Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
Arnaud Dellis ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, vol. 59, issue 1, 110-119
Weak undominance is a standard refinement in the voting literature. This work characterizes the set of weakly undominated voting strategies in scoring rule elections. Scoring rules are voting procedures under which voters cast scores for the different alternatives or candidates. The scoring rules include many of the most widely used and studied voting procedures, such as Plurality Voting, the Borda Count and Approval Voting.
Keywords: Weak; undominance; Equilibrium; refinement; Strategic; voting; Scoring; rule; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:59:y:2010:i:1:p:110-119
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