Family regulation as a moving target in the demographic transition

Noël Bonneuil

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, vol. 59, issue 2, 239-248

Abstract: The consideration of mortality changes equilibrium with unilateral gifts in the economics of family regulation. Expressions for each spouse's allocation to the common good are obtained that are consistent with the pre-eminent role of mortality in the fertility decline. The other determinant of equilibrium is the husband-wife productivity ratio. Furthermore, in a context of demographic transition, the adjustment of allocations to their equilibrium values may be not instantaneous, and the transition resembles the pursuit of a moving target rather than a shift in equilibrium. One consequence is the lack of correlation between the fertility decline and economic variables.

Keywords: Demographic; transition; Unilateral; gift; equilibrium; Family; economy; Target; pursuit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:59:y:2010:i:2:p:239-248

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