Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes

Carlos Pimienta ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, vol. 59, issue 3, 364-365

Abstract: A two-person game form is given by nonempty finite sets S1, S2 of pure strategies, a nonempty set [Omega] of outcomes, and a function [theta]:S1xS2-->[Delta]([Omega]), where [Delta]([Omega]) is the set of probability measures on [Omega]. We prove that if the set of outcomes contains just three elements, generically, there are finitely many distributions on [Omega] induced by Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Generic; finiteness; Game; forms; Nash; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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