Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems

Jonathan Perry and Robert C. Powers

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, vol. 60, issue 1, 57-60

Abstract: We introduce the notion of a quota pair system and show that any social choice procedure, where there are exactly two alternatives and a fixed number of voters, satisfies anonymity and monotonicity if and only if it is uniquely determined by a quota pair system.

Keywords: Anonymity; Monotonicity; Simple; majority; rule; Abstention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(10)00024-7
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:1:p:57-60

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().