Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, vol. 60, issue 2, 154-159

Abstract: We consider one-to-one matching with externalities, where the individuals are allowed to be single. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of the stable set and the core.

Keywords: One-to-one; matching; Externalities; Stability; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:2:p:154-159

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