The give-up problem for blocked regional lists with multi-winners
Federica Ricca,
Andrea Scozzari and
Bruno Simeone
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, vol. 62, issue 1, 14-24
Abstract:
The current electoral law for the Italian Parliament prescribes blocked, linearly ordered lists of candidates for each party within each constituency. The peculiarity of the Italian electoral system is that a party can present the same candidate in different constituencies. There are several seats at stake in each constituency; these seats are allocated to the parties proportionally to the total number of votes they get. If the blocked list mechanism-which assigns the seats obtained by a party in a constituency to the first candidates of the corresponding ordered list-causes some candidates to win in more than one constituency, they may retain only one of the seats, giving up all the remaining ones. Thus, the problem arises for a party to find a suitable "schedule of give-ups" that produces the final set of winners for that party. In order to do this, we assume that such decision is centralized and based on some models of global (inter-regional) preferences over the set of candidates. In this paper, we introduce two classes of models to formulate the "give-up problem", i.e., utility and ordinal models, and we show that for both of them some natural formulations of the problem can be efficiently solved by network flows techniques.
Date: 2011
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