Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility

Mamoru Kaneko () and Aniruddha Mitra

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, vol. 62, issue 1, 34-45

Abstract: This paper provides an analysis of discrimination and prejudices from the perspective of inductive game theory. We extend the festival game, originally given by Kaneko-Matsui, to include new constraints on the observability of ethnic identities and on accessible locations for players. We characterize the Nash equilibrium set, which reveals a different variety of segregation patterns and discriminatory behavior. In order to facilitate the analysis of discrimination and prejudices, we introduce a measure of discrimination, which chooses a representative equilibrium with the smallest degree of discrimination. Using this measure, we discuss various new phenomena, such as discrimination in an ethnic hierarchy; similar ethnicities as discriminated and as discriminating; and mutual discrimination. The introduction of limited observability and accessibility enables us to obtain those results.

Date: 2011
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