Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

Subhadip Chakrabarti and Supanit Tangsangasaksri

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, vol. 62, issue 1, 55-64

Abstract: In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability.

Date: 2011
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