EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes

Yi-You Yang

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, vol. 62, issue 1, 65-70

Abstract: (Kóczy and Lauwers, 2004) and (Kóczy and Lauwers, 2007) show that the collection of absorbing outcomes, i.e., the coalition structure core, of a TU game, if non-empty, is a minimal dominant set. The paper complements the result in two respects. First, it is shown that the coalition structure core, if non-empty, can be reached from any outcome via a sequence of successive blocks in quadratic time. Second, we observe that an analogous result holds for accessible outcomes, namely, the collection of accessible outcomes, if non-empty, is a minimal dominant set. Moreover, we give an existence theorem for accessible outcomes, which implies that the minimal dominant set of a cohesive game is exactly the coalition structure core or the collection of accessible outcomes, either of which can be reached from any outcome in linear time.

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489611000369
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:65-70

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:65-70