Share the gain, share the pain? Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions

Elisabeth Gugl and Justin Leroux

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 133-143

Abstract: We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions may preclude transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). Holding the disagreement point fixed, we show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to either benefit jointly or suffer jointly with any change in production possibilities under well-behaved generalized utilitarian bargaining solutions (of which the Nash bargaining and the utilitarian solutions are special cases). We apply the result to policy analysis and to incentive compatibility.

Date: 2011
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Related works:
Working Paper: Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions (2009)
Working Paper: Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities, and Bargaining Solutions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:3:p:133-143

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.002

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