Preferences for harmony and minority voting

Theresa C. Fahrenberger and Hans Gersbach

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 63, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: We examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research.

Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:1:p:1-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.06.002

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