Preferences for harmony and minority voting
Theresa C. Fahrenberger and
Hans Gersbach ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 63, issue 1, 1-13
We examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research.
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