Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games

Toshimasa Maruta and Akira Okada

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 63, issue 1, 31-42

Abstract: Best response structure of n-person binary coordination games suggests that equilibrium selection outcome is determined by the balance of the ordinal aspects and the cardinal aspects of the game. This intuition inspires new equilibrium selection results for that class of games under the adaptive play with mistakes. Detailed comparison of the adaptive play and the single population random matching is made possible by these results. It turns out that stochastic stability in the adaptive play depends sharply on details of the ordinal, pure strategy best response structure that are indiscernible to the single population random matching.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:1:p:31-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.007

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