The minimum-based procedure: A principled way to allocate seats in the European Parliament

Thomas Kellermann

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 63, issue 2, 102-106

Abstract: This work proposes the minimum-based procedure for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament taking into account the criticism of the Cambridge Compromise proposal. The procedure is underpinned by the (base + strict prop) system which only allocates a minimum number of seats to the Member States. The degree (effective maximum number) and type (distribution of remaining seats) of degressivity remain essentially a political decision.

Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489611001132
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:2:p:102-106

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.004

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().