Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives

Vikram Manjunath

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 63, issue 3, 239-242

Abstract: We study rules for choosing between two alternatives when people may be indifferent between them. We specify two strategic requirements for groups of people. The first, group strategy-proofness, says that manipulations by groups ought not make every member of the group better off. The second, strong group strategy-proofness, says that such manipulations ought not make even one member of the group better off without making another worse off. Our main result is a characterization of “consensus” rules and “constant” rules as the only strongly group strategy-proof rules when there are more than two people.

Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:3:p:239-242

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.02.003

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