Carrots, sticks and fog during insurgencies

Michael P. Atkinson, Moshe Kress and Roberto Szechtman

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 64, issue 3, 203-213

Abstract: We formulate a rational choice model of popular behavior during an insurgency. An individual in the population either supports the insurgents or the government depending upon his attitude and the actions taken by each side. We focus on the effect of insurgency actions: benefits, impositions, and coercion. While benefits and impositions are applied uniformly throughout, the insurgents intend to only coerce those actively providing information to the government. However, due to the “fog of war”, which may lead to limited situational awareness, the insurgents may mistakenly coerce their own supporters and potentially drive them to aid the government. We examine how popular behavior varies under different situational awareness scenarios. When the insurgents have little situational awareness, they should take few coercive actions. This implies that the government will be able to foster intelligence sources within the population. If the insurgents have perfect situational awareness, tipping points may occur that result in a significant reduction in active support for the government. In this case the government should take actions to decrease the coercing effectiveness of the insurgents and increase incentives to the population so they continue to provide information.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:203-213

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.03.007

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