Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication

Stefan Napel, Andreas Nohn and José Maria Alonso-Meijide

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, vol. 64, issue 3, 247-257

Abstract: Indices that evaluate the distribution of power in simple games are commonly required to be monotonic in voting weights when the game represents a voting body such as a shareholder meeting, parliament, etc. The standard notions of local or global monotonicity are bound to be violated, however, if cooperation is restricted to coalitions that are connected by a communication graph. This paper proposes new monotonicity concepts for power in games with communication structure and investigates the monotonicity properties of the Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value, the position value, and the average tree solution.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:247-257

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.008

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