Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules
Sususmu Cato ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 1, 40-47
Suzumura consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weak-order extension. This paper provides some remarks on collective choice rules that generate Suzumura consistent social preferences. We examine the properties of such collective choice rules by introducing a procedural condition on collective choice rules. As applications of the procedural condition, we first investigate the decisive structure of a Paretian collective choice rule, and then consider the assignment of individual rights. In our analysis, the concept of semi-decisiveness works effectively.
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