A hardness result for core stability in additive hedonic games

Gerhard J. Woeginger

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 2, 101-104

Abstract: We investigate the computational complexity of a decision problem in hedonic coalition formation games. We prove that core stability in additive hedonic games is complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:2:p:101-104

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.10.001

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