On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value

Tadeusz Radzik and Theo Driessen

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 2, 105-111

Abstract: In this paper we study a family of efficient, symmetric and linear values for TU-games, described by some formula generalizing the Shapley value. These values appear to have surprising properties described in terms of the axioms: Fair treatment, monotonicity and two types of acceptability. The results obtained are discussed in the context of the Shapley value, the solidarity value, the least square prenucleolus and the consensus value.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:2:p:105-111

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.10.002

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