Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence

Ryuji Sano

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 2, 112-117

Abstract: This paper characterizes the class of combinatorial auctions that have a particular form of Nash equilibrium. We refer to this class as Vickrey-reserve auctions. In such auctions, bidders pay at least their Vickrey–Clarke–Groves payments. A specific strategy profile studied by Bernheim and Whinston [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1–31] is a Nash equilibrium of every Vickrey-reserve auction even in the presence of complementarities, and it implements an outcome in the bidder-optimal core.

Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:2:p:112-117

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.10.005

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