Voting chances instead of voting weights

Paolo Di Giannatale and Francesco Passarelli

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 3, 164-173

Abstract: We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents’ political power is disproportionate with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate both the economic and the political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot prevent political distortions from emerging in a huge mass of situations. Distortions are less severe if partners can leave the union at low cost.

Date: 2013
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Related works:
Working Paper: Voting chances instead of voting weights (2012)
Working Paper: Voting chances instead of voting weights (2012)
Working Paper: Voting Chances Instead of Voting Weights (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:164-173

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.003

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