Power measures derived from the sequential query process

Geoffrey Pritchard, Reyhaneh Reyhani and Mark C. Wilson

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 3, 174-180

Abstract: We study a basic sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley–Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual decisiveness in simple games, and show that, as for the Shapley–Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures for TU-games. These individual measures, which we call weighted semivalues, form a class whose intersection with that of the class of weak semivalues yields the class of all semivalues.

Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:174-180

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.003

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