Collective approval

Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 65, issue 3, 190-194

Abstract: We consider the problem of aggregating individual approval ballots into one collective approval ballot. An approval ballot is simply a subset of a given set of alternatives. An individual may approve of as many alternatives as he or she wishes. Each approval is counted as a vote. We show that if an aggregation rule is neutral, consistent and discerning, then an alternative is collectively approved of if it receives a number of votes greater than the mean number of votes received by the alternatives and is not approved of if it receives a number of votes less than the mean.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489612001175
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:190-194

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.004

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().