The prenucleolus for games with restricted cooperation

Ilya Katsev () and Elena Yanovskaya

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 66, issue 1, 56-65

Abstract: A game with restricted cooperation is a triple (N,v,Ω), where N is a finite set of players, Ω⊂2N is a nonempty collection of feasible coalitions such that N∈Ω, and v:Ω→R is a characteristic function. The definition implies that if Ω=2N, then the game (N,v,Ω)=(N,v) is the classical transferable utility (TU) cooperative game.

Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:1:p:56-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.006

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