Single-plateaued choice

Walter Bossert and Hans Peters

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 66, issue 2, 134-139

Abstract: Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple best elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-plateauedness in a choice-theoretic setting. Single-plateaued choice is characterized by means of a collinear interval continuity property in the presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Further results establish that, our notion of single-plateauedness conforms to the motivation underlying the term and we analyze the consequences of alternative continuity properties. The importance of basic assumptions such as closedness and convexity is discussed.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Single-plateaued choice (2012)
Working Paper: Single-Plateaued Choice (2012)
Working Paper: Single-plateaued choice (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:2:p:134-139

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.01.008

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