Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options

André Casajus and Andreas Tutić

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 66, issue 3, 262-267

Abstract: We introduce a weighted version of the component efficient χ-value [Casajus, A., 2009. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability. Games and Economic Behavior 65 (1), 49–61] for TU games with a coalition structure. We provide characterizations both for a symmetric and for an asymmetric treatment of outside options. Further, the stability of coalition structures is explored. These concepts are applied to apex games.

Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:262-267

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.05.006

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