Satisficing and maximizing consumers in a monopolistic screening model

Mauro Papi

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 66, issue 3, 385-389

Abstract: We study a simple model in which a monopolist supplies a multi-attribute good and does not know whether the consumer is an expected-utility maximizer or a boundedly rational type that follows the satisficing heuristic proposed by Herbert Simon. We find that, unless the probability of the consumer being fully rational is sufficiently high, the fact that a boundedly rational consumer never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives implies that he/she never ends up with an alternative strictly better than his/her aspiration levels.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489613000760
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:385-389

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.005

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().