A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium

Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, vol. 66, issue 3, 422-430

Abstract: We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:422-430

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003

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