Formal utilitarianism and range voting

Marcus Pivato

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, vol. 67, issue C, 50-56

Abstract: In formal utilitarian voting, each voter assigns a numerical value to each alternative, and society chooses the alternative with the highest total value. Range voting is similar, except that each voter’s values are constrained to lie in the interval [0,1]. We characterize these rules via the axioms of anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, overwhelming majority, and two novel conditions: maximal expressiveness, and an absence of “minority overrides”.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:67:y:2014:i:c:p:50-56

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.002

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