Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure

Gleb Koshevoy and Adolphus Talman

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, vol. 68, issue C, 19-30

Abstract: We introduce a theory of marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with transferable utility and arbitrary set systems representing the set of feasible coalitions. The theory is based on the notion of strictly nested sets in a set system. For each maximal strictly nested set, we define a unique marginal contribution vector. Using these marginal contribution vectors several solutions concepts are introduced.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:68:y:2014:i:c:p:19-30

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.12.004

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