Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, vol. 69, issue C, 43-49

Abstract: We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In finite economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent’s maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules which are least manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent’s maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find an envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:69:y:2014:i:c:p:43-49

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.006

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