Collateral in banking policy: On the possibility of signaling

Volker Bieta, Udo Broll and Wilfried Siebe

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, vol. 71, issue C, 137-141

Abstract: In this paper we study the validity of the assertion that collateral is in a position to signal the degree of borrowers’ riskiness. We use a framework in which the cash flow from the risky project is described by means of a continuous density and projects are classified by second-order stochastic dominance. We show that if collateral is assumed bounded by the initial project outlay the positive role of collateral, namely truthfully conveying the private information about the project risk by the collateral amount, can no longer be ensured.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:71:y:2014:i:c:p:137-141

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.06.002

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