When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?

Yajing Chen

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, vol. 71, issue C, 43-45

Abstract: Kumano (2013) is the first to investigate the Boston school choice mechanism (BOSM) under restricted priority domains. This paper strengthens and extends his result and shows that the BOSM is strategy-proof, if and only if it is fair, if and only if it is equivalent to the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM), and if and only if the number of total seats at any two schools exceeds the number of students.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:71:y:2014:i:c:p:43-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.03.001

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