Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

Takashi Akahoshi

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, vol. 72, issue C, 7-13

Abstract: We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges’ preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges’ preference relations. Even when the colleges’ true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:72:y:2014:i:c:p:7-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001

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