On the centipede game with a social norm

M. Khan, Haomiao Yu and Zhixiang Zhang

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 75, issue C, 16-19

Abstract: In this paper, we present a formulation of the centipede game where inter-subjectivity between players is formalized through random costs that are an increasing function, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, of the number of iterations for which the game is played. This injection of a time-dependent social norm, one that also parametrizes player proximity, as an element of each player’s introspective calculations formalizes a setting under which subgame perfection dictates cooperative outcomes.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:16-19

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.02.001

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