Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 76, issue C, 107-109

Abstract: I axiomatize the n-person asymmetric Nash bargaining solution on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, feasible set continuity, and conflict-freeness—the requirement that the solution selects the ideal point whenever it is feasible to do so.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:76:y:2015:i:c:p:107-109

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.007

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