Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 76, issue C, 107-109
I axiomatize the n-person asymmetric Nash bargaining solution on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, feasible set continuity, and conflict-freeness—the requirement that the solution selects the ideal point whenever it is feasible to do so.
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