Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games

C. Larrea and L. Ruiz

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 76, issue C, 125-130

Abstract: In this paper we introduce simple coalitional strategy profiles to avoid group deviations in repeated games. In the repeated Cournot supergame we prove that it is possible to sustain the symmetric monopoly outcome by means of a variety of strategies which satisfy the requirement that no coalition (other than the grand one) will deviate in any subgame.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:76:y:2015:i:c:p:125-130

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.009

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