Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules

Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Olivia J. Erdélyi and Jörg Rothe

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 76, issue C, 19-30

Abstract: Endriss et al. (2012) initiated the complexity-theoretic study of problems related to judgment aggregation. We extend their results on the manipulation of two specific judgment aggregation procedures to a whole class of such procedures, namely to uniform premise-based quota rules. In addition, we consider incomplete judgment sets and the notions of top-respecting and closeness-respecting preferences introduced by Dietrich and List (2007). This complements previous work on the complexity of manipulation in judgment aggregation that focused on Hamming-distance-respecting preferences only, which we also study here. Furthermore, inspired by work on bribery in voting (Faliszewski and Rothe, in press), we introduce and study the closely related issue of bribery in judgment aggregation.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:76:y:2015:i:c:p:19-30

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.03.006

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