Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective
Alex Possajennikov ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 77, issue C, 55-61
Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player’s strategy and on an aggregate of all players’ strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be evolutionarily stable in an infinite population, where a conjecture is consistent if it is equal to the marginal change in the aggregate determined by the actual best responses. In the finite population case, only zero conjectures representing aggregate-taking behavior can be evolutionarily stable.
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Working Paper: Conjectural Variations in Aggregative Games: An Evolutionary Perspective (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:77:y:2015:i:c:p:55-61
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