The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs

Carsten Nielsen

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 78, issue C, 89-105

Abstract: We provide a characterization of the optimal loan contract with costly state verification for the bank when the entrepreneur is risk averse and holds a belief different from that of the bank.

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: The Loan Contract with Costly State Verification and Subjective Beliefs (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:78:y:2015:i:c:p:89-105

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.002

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