Two-tier voting: Measuring inequality and specifying the inverse power problem

Matthias Weber

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol. 79, issue C, 40-45

Abstract: There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, with each group represented by a single person. This paper is about two closely related problems. The first is that of how to measure the inequality of a voting system in such a setting. The second is the inverse power problem: the problem of finding voting systems that approximate equal indirect voting power as well as possible. I argue that the coefficient of variation is appropriate to measure the inequality of a voting system and to specify the inverse problem. I then show how specifying the inverse problem with the coefficient of variation compares to using existing objective functions.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:79:y:2016:i:c:p:40-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.008

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